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Link copiedElection security is the combination of safeguards used to protect election systems, data, equipment, ballots, facilities and processes from unauthorized access, disruption, error, tampering or loss. In the United States, those safeguards operate across the election lifecycle from voter registration and system preparation to ballot handling, vote counting, audits and certification.
Election security is therefore broader than protecting voting machines from cyberattacks. It depends on technology, physical controls, trained people, documented procedures and checks that help detect problems and verify what happened.
What does election security protect?
U.S. elections depend on a wide range of election infrastructure, including voter-registration databases, voting and tabulation systems, election-management technology, facilities and systems used to report results.
Protecting that infrastructure means keeping systems and data available, preventing unauthorized changes, controlling access, securing physical materials and preserving records that can later be checked.
The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) lists common safeguards such as locks, tamper-evident seals, security cameras, system testing, audits, and physical and cybersecurity access controls. The exact measures vary by jurisdiction and by the systems in use. See the EAC's Election Security guidance.
Why is election security built in layers?
No single safeguard can address every election risk.
A password cannot secure a ballot box. A tamper-evident seal cannot protect an online account from stolen credentials. Pre-election system testing does not replace the need to document who handled equipment, and post-election audits do not replace controls used before voting.
Election security therefore combines layers such as:
- Digital safeguards for systems, accounts, networks and data.
- Voting-system testing and certification to check technology against applicable requirements.
- Physical safeguards for equipment, ballots, facilities and storage.
- Documented procedures and chain of custody for access and transfers.
- Post-election checks that reconcile records, audit results and support certification.
The value comes from the layers working together.
How are election data and accounts protected?
Election offices use cybersecurity controls to protect systems and data from attack, unauthorized access, disruption and loss.
Access control determines who may enter a facility, use a system or perform a particular action. Digital access can be strengthened through multi-factor authentication, which requires more than one authentication factor.
These protections can apply to voter-registration systems, staff email, websites, election-management systems and results-reporting infrastructure as well as voting technology.
NIST's Cybersecurity Framework Election Infrastructure Profile provides a risk-based approach for election-related systems. NIST also highlights multi-factor authentication, trustworthy email, data integrity and recovery in its Election Security Guides.
How are voting systems tested and secured?
A voting system is more than an individual voting machine. It can include hardware, software, firmware, ballot-definition functions, vote-recording and counting equipment, reporting functions, audit records and supporting documentation.
At the federal level, the EAC maintains the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), which provide specifications and requirements used to test voting systems for functionality, accessibility and security capabilities.
The EAC also accredits Voting System Test Laboratories and operates a federal testing and certification programme. State participation is voluntary, although many states use EAC certification requirements or incorporate them into state rules. States may also impose additional requirements. See the EAC's Testing and Certification Program.
Certification is not the last check before voting. Election officials also perform pre-election testing required by their jurisdiction. Logic and accuracy testing, for example, is used to identify equipment problems or incorrect election-specific configuration before a system is used.
How are ballots, equipment and facilities protected?
Election security also depends on physical security.
Voting equipment may move between storage facilities, election offices and voting locations. Ballots and election records may also pass through several authorised hands. Safeguards can include controlled storage, locks, seals, surveillance, restricted access and documented transport.
A central concept is chain of custody: documenting who handled an asset, when it was transferred, where it went and why.
The EAC's Chain of Custody Best Practices recommends written procedures and documentation for election materials, voting systems, transfers, storage and audit-related handling.
What checks continue after voting ends?
Election security does not stop when the polls close.
Jurisdictions carry out processes to account for ballots and records, verify totals and move from unofficial results toward official results. The exact sequence and legal requirements vary.
An audit is one type of review used to evaluate records, systems, controls or results. States use different audit methods and requirements.
Officials may also reconcile records, review outstanding ballots, conduct the canvass and complete the legally required certification of official election results. These checks provide an additional layer of verification rather than replacing the safeguards used earlier.
How do the layers fit together?
Before voting, officials protect election systems, control user access, prepare ballots, configure equipment and conduct required testing. Equipment and materials are stored and transported under physical controls and documented procedures.
During voting, access controls, equipment monitoring, ballot security and recordkeeping continue. After voting, ballots and records move through tabulation, reconciliation, audits or other required checks before results become official.
The important point is that election security combines prevention, detection, documentation and verification. A control at one stage supports but does not replace controls at another.
Does election security mean an election has no risk?
No. Security does not mean that mistakes, equipment failures, cyber incidents, physical threats or human error can never occur.
Security practice manages risk by identifying what could go wrong, reducing the likelihood or impact of problems, detecting abnormal events and preserving ways to recover or verify what happened. NIST describes its Election Infrastructure Profile as a risk-based approach for this reason.
Do election-security procedures vary by state?
Yes. U.S. election administration is decentralised, and state and local laws, technology and procedures differ.
Federal bodies such as the EAC and NIST provide standards, guidance, testing programmes and technical resources, but they do not create one identical operating procedure for every jurisdiction. States can differ in voting-system certification, pre-election testing, audit methods, ballot handling and result-certification processes.
For a specific legal or procedural question, readers should consult the relevant state or local election authority.
Related ESG terms
- Election Infrastructure
- Cybersecurity
- Access Control
- Multi-Factor Authentication
- Voting System
- Voluntary Voting System Guidelines
- Logic and Accuracy Testing
- Chain of Custody
- Audit
- Certification of Official Election Results
Frequently asked questions
1. Is election security only about cybersecurity?
No. Cybersecurity is one layer. Election officials also use physical controls, voting-system testing, access restrictions, chain-of-custody documentation, staff procedures, contingency planning and post-election verification to protect both digital systems and physical election processes.
2. Who is responsible for election security in the United States?
State and local election officials administer elections and apply the procedures required in their jurisdictions. Federal organisations provide support: the EAC develops voting-system guidance and operates a testing and certification programme, while NIST develops technical standards and cybersecurity resources.
3. Are voting systems checked before an election?
Yes, although requirements differ by jurisdiction. Voting systems may undergo federal or state certification, and election officials conduct pre-election checks such as logic and accuracy testing to confirm that equipment is functioning and configured for the specific election.
4. What happens after votes are counted to help verify an election?
Procedures vary, but they can include reconciliation of election records, review of outstanding ballots, canvassing, post-election audits and formal certification. These processes help election officials account for records and move from preliminary or unofficial totals to legally certified results.
Sources and further reading
- U.S. Election Assistance Commission — Election Security
- U.S. Election Assistance Commission — Election Management Guidelines
- U.S. Election Assistance Commission — Voting System Testing & Certification Program
- U.S. Election Assistance Commission — Voluntary Voting System Guidelines
- U.S. Election Assistance Commission — Chain of Custody Best Practices
- National Institute of Standards and Technology — Cybersecurity Framework Election Infrastructure Profile
- National Institute of Standards and Technology — Election Security Guides
