Election Misinformation, Disinformation and Malinformation: What's the Difference?

Election misinformation is false information shared without an intention to cause harm. Disinformation is false information deliberately created or spread to mislead, harm or manipulate. Malinformation is based on fact but presented out of context in a way intended to mislead, harm or manipulate.

The differences depend on more than accuracy. Intent separates misinformation from disinformation, while context is central to malinformation. The same false claim can even change category as different people share it.

What do misinformation, disinformation and malinformation mean?

The framework used by ESG follows definitions found in the Center for Internet Security's Essential Guide to Election Security and earlier CISA election-security guidance.

Misinformation

Misinformation is false information that is not created or shared with the intention of causing harm.

For example, a voter might unknowingly share an outdated graphic showing the wrong polling-place closing time for the current election.

Disinformation

Disinformation is false information deliberately created or spread to deceive or manipulate.

For example, knowingly creating a fake notice with the wrong election date and presenting it as an official announcement is disinformation. The defining difference is intentional deception.

Malinformation

Malinformation is information based on fact but used out of context to mislead, harm or manipulate.

For example, an authentic photograph from an older election could be deliberately presented as evidence of something happening in the current election.

What is the simplest way to tell the three apart?

MDM Comparison Table

This distinction matters because not every inaccurate statement is disinformation, and not every misleading communication is entirely fabricated.

Can the same claim change from disinformation to misinformation?

Yes.

If someone deliberately creates a false post saying a polling location has closed, that is disinformation. A second person who believes the post and shares it as a warning may instead be spreading misinformation.

The content is the same, but the sharer's intent is different. This is why a false claim alone does not always prove deliberate deception.

What kinds of election information can be affected?

Election-related MDM can concern almost any part of election administration.

Common subjects include registration deadlines, polling locations, voter-identification requirements, mail-ballot rules, voting systems, election-night reporting, counting, audits and certification.

The Center for Internet Security highlights many of these practical processes. Incorrect voting instructions can confuse voters, while misleading explanations of normal post-election procedures can create false impressions even without changing any vote count.

Are opinions or political disagreements misinformation?

Not simply because they are disputed or unpopular.

An opinion, prediction, criticism or political argument is not automatically misinformation or disinformation. The categories are most useful when applied to factual claims that can be checked against evidence.

“I dislike this state's mail-ballot policy” is an opinion; “mail ballots in this state must arrive by Tuesday” is a factual claim that can be checked. Satire or parody also is not automatically disinformation simply because it contains false statements.

The Center for Internet Security's election guidance states that opinions are not misinformation. ESG should therefore use these terms for information characteristics, not as labels for viewpoints, parties, candidates or criticism.

How can genuine information become malinformation?

Context can change the meaning of otherwise authentic material.

An authentic video from a previous election can become malinformation if it is deliberately reposted as evidence of a current nationwide event. Other tactics include presenting old material as new, treating a local event as nationwide, omitting crucial context or misrepresenting what a genuine document proves.

Malinformation is therefore different from a straightforward factual error.

How do manipulated media and generative AI fit in?

Technology can make misleading content easier to create and distribute, but the technology itself does not determine whether content is misinformation or disinformation.

Generative artificial intelligence can produce text, images, audio and video. These tools have legitimate uses, but they can also be used to create fabricated articles, synthetic images or convincing fake audio and video.

The FBI and CISA warned in 2024 that foreign threat actors were using generative AI and manipulated media to produce influence content more quickly. But synthetic content is not automatically disinformation: a clearly labelled fictional video may be legitimate, while fabricated media intentionally presented as authentic evidence may qualify.

Is MDM the same as an influence operation?

No.

An influence operation is broader than one false or misleading claim. ESG's information operations entry covers capabilities intended to influence or disrupt decision-making; election-related campaigns may combine disinformation with authentic material, fake personas, amplification or cyber activity.

Inauthentic behavior concerns deception about who is behind an account or campaign. A troll farm is an organised source of manipulative online activity. Neither term is a synonym for misinformation.

Why does accurate election communication matter?

Election administration involves deadlines, procedures and stages that are not always intuitive to the public.

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission's 2026 Communicating Election and Post-Election Processes Toolkit encourages election officials to explain these processes clearly and consistently, including areas where voters may have questions or concerns.

Earlier joint EAC/CISA guidance similarly recommends proactive communication about election dates, registration, voting locations, security measures, preliminary results and other official processes.

Clear official information gives voters a reliable point of comparison when they encounter an unfamiliar claim. Because U.S. election rules vary, practical instructions should generally be checked with the relevant state or local election authority.

How should readers evaluate an election-related claim?

The goal is not to label every questionable post immediately. A better approach is to check what can be verified.

Before relying on or sharing a claim:

1. Identify the factual claim and separate it from opinion.
2. Check the date and location so old or local information is not mistaken for current nationwide information.
3. Find the original source rather than relying on a screenshot or clipped video.
4. Check the relevant election authority for dates, rules, locations and official results.
5. Look for independent evidence rather than repeated copies of one source.
6. Be cautious about inferring intent when the evidence only establishes that a claim is inaccurate.

These habits are part of digital literacy.

Related ESG terms

1. Misinformation
2. Disinformation
3. Malinformation
4. Inauthentic Behavior
5. Information Operations
6. Troll Farm
7. Generative Artificial Intelligence
8. Digital Literacy

Frequently asked questions

1. Is all false election information disinformation?

No. False information is disinformation only when deliberate deception is part of its creation or spread. A person who unknowingly shares an incorrect voting deadline may be spreading misinformation instead. Determining intent can require more evidence than the content of a single post provides.

2. Can true information be misleading?

Yes. Under the MDM framework, malinformation is based on fact but deliberately used out of context to mislead, harm or manipulate. An authentic photograph, document or statistic can create a false impression if its date, location, scope or surrounding context is deliberately misrepresented.

3. Is AI-generated election content automatically disinformation?

No. Generative AI is a content-creation technology. Whether AI-generated material is disinformation depends on how it is used. Clearly labelled synthetic content can be legitimate; fabricated material intentionally presented as authentic evidence in order to deceive can qualify as disinformation.

4. Where should voters verify election information?

For practical voting rules, deadlines, polling locations and official election procedures, voters should use the relevant state or local election authority. The EAC also provides national voter-information resources, but election administration is decentralised and many rules differ by jurisdiction.

Sources and further reading

1. Center for Internet Security — Essential Guide to Election Security: Glossary
2. Center for Internet Security — Managing Inaccurate Election Information
3. U.S. Election Assistance Commission — Communicating Election and Post-Election Processes Toolkit
4. U.S. Election Assistance Commission — Communications 101
5. EAC and CISA — Enhancing Election Security Through Public Communications
6. CISA — Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation Planning and Incident Response Guide for Election Officials
7. FBI and CISA — Foreign Threat Actors Likely to Use a Variety of Tactics to Develop and Spread Disinformation